Median pre-tax in-cash income fell more over the first three years of the Great Recession (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) and its aftermath than over the first three years of any other recession since the March Current Population Survey (CPS) first enabled this statistic to be measured annually in 1968. However, there was an unprecedented governmental response in the form of tax cuts and government transfer increases, including both in-cash (Unemployment Insurance, etc.) and inkind (Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Benefits (SNAP) or Food Stamps, etc.) benefits. These tax and transfer responses substantially offset this loss of market income for middle-and lowerincome Americans. Here we estimate the importance of these government actions and other factors that account for trends in median income as well as mean income in the bottom and top quintiles over the Great Recession and compare it to previous recessions. In accounting for income trends, we not only consider government tax and transfer policies, but also the importance of employment, demographics and source-specific income. Doing so provides a more complete understanding of why the Great Recession and its aftermath presented policymakers with a different type of economic crisis and the way they responded to it.
Using a shift-share analysis to compare the factors underlying income trends in each of the past four recessions, we show that the falling real earnings of those who remained employed played a relatively minor role in household income declines during the Great Recession. Instead, drops in employment primarily drove these income declines, which would have been much greater, except for the unprecedented role of public tax and both in-cash and in-kind transfer policies. Because previous decomposition studies have not included the role of either tax policies or in-kind transfers, they will greatly understate the increasing role that government policies have played in mitigating median income declines and understate the resources that were available to Americans over the Great Recession.
Data
We primarily use the public use March Current Population Survey (CPS) supplemented with cell-means for top-coded incomes from Larrimore et al. (2008) in our analyses.
1 Although the public use CPS data is commonly used for evaluating U.S. income and income inequality trends (see e.g. Gottschalk and Danziger 2005 , Daly and Valetta 2006 , and Blank 2011 , it measures income on a pre-tax basis and only includes transfers when they are received in cash form. We will refer to this basic Census Bureau measure of income as "pre-tax" income. Since policymakers are increasingly using tax policies and in-kind transfers to mitigate income declines during recessions, it is necessary to supplement the CPS data with data on taxes and inkind transfers. We will refer to this enhanced income measure which also accounts for taxes and in-kind transfers as "post-tax" income.
We generally use the same procedures for estimating the value of in-kind transfers, tax credits, and tax liabilities as in Armour, Burkhauser, and Larrimore (2013) . The Census Bureau imputes the value of SNAP (food stamps), housing subsidies, and school lunches on an annual basis. We use these values in our estimates. Each are now generally recognized as important resources primarily available to low income households, and the Census Bureau now includes them as resources in their Supplemental Poverty Measure (Interagency Technical Working Group, 2010) . 2 We impute the value of tax credits and liabilities using the NBER TaxSim 9.0.
1 Larrimore et al. (2008) demonstrates that the public use CPS data supplemented with cell-means for top-coded incomes produces results for income and income inequality trends that closely match those found in the internal CPS data used by the Census Bureau to produce their official income statistics (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and Smith 2013) . 2 While there is general agreement that the full market value of these in-kind transfers should be included in any measure of income, including employer-or government-provided health insurance benefits at their full market value is more controversial. Some researchers, including Armour, Burkhauser, and Larrimore (2013) and CBO (2012) include health insurance benefits at their full market value, but they are not included as resources in the Census Bureau's Supplemental Poverty Measure or at their full market value for those in poverty in Census Bureau studies (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor and Smith 2013 , Interagency Technical Working Group 2010 , and Short, 2012 . Here we take the most conservative approach and value them at zero in our analysis, as the Census Bureau (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor and Smith 2013) and CPS-based researchers (see e.g. Gottschalk and Danziger 2005) have traditionally done. Including them at their full market value would substantially increase the level of government in-kind transfers and their growth would offset a portion of the declines in market income over the years of our analysis.
These tax credits and liabilities include federal and state tax liabilities as well as FICA and SECA taxes based on the tax laws in effect in each year (Feenberg and Coutts 1993, provide an overview of the NBER TaxSim program). Since the CPS samples households, which may include multiple tax filing units, we divide each household into tax units prior to imputing tax liabilities using the same procedure in Burkhauser et al. (2012) , which is based on the same assumptions regarding potential tax units as first used in Piketty and Saez (2003) .
Our unit of analysis is the individual and we adjust our measure of post-tax household income to account for economies of scale in household consumption by dividing total income by the square-root of household size and assigning this value to each member of the household. 3 All income is adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index Research Series (CPI-U-RS) (Stewart and Reed 1999) . Figure 1 shows the trends in the median size-adjusted household income of persons between 1979 and 2012, both using our pre-tax (dashed-line) and post-tax (solid line) income measures. We normalize income to 1.00 in 1979 to show percentage change since 1979 for all other years. We denote peaks of each business cycle (1979, 1989, 2000, and 2007 ) with solid vertical lines, and troughs (1983, 1992, and 2004 ) with dashed vertical lines.
Long-term trends in median income
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Regardless of whether it is measured on a pre-tax or a post-tax basis, median income traditionally has risen over time when compared at equivalent points in the business cycle, 3 This size-adjustment is commonly used in U.S. and cross-national studies of inequality (see e.g. Gottschalk and Smeeding 1997 , Atkinson and Brandolini 2001 , Burkhauser et al. 2011 as well as by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in its official measures of income inequality and poverty (d 'Ercole and Förster 2012) . It also closely matches the adjustments for household size implied by the Census Bureau poverty thresholds (Ruggles 1990) . 4 Official NBER macroeconomic business cycle recession years are denoted in gray vertical bars in Figure 1 . In our analyses peak and trough business cycle years are defined by peaks and troughs in median income with one exception. Because median income only slightly increased in 1983 and unemployment rates persisted above 10 percent for half of that year, we consider 1983 rather than 1982 to be the last year of that recession. In addition, because median income declined continuously in the early 1980s we consider the 1979-1983 double-dip recession as if it was single continuous recession.
although it is sensitive to business cycle variations. This is the case for both the [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] business cycle-pre-tax income rises by about 9 percent-and the 1989-2000 business cycle-it increases by about 13 percent. Post-tax income rises by similar amounts over these two business cycles.
However, over the 2000-2007 business cycle median pre-tax income stagnates. In contrast, post-tax median income rises by 2 percentage points over this period. Hence, while both series record slower growth in median income in the early 2000s, for the first time accounting for government taxes and in-kind transfers substantially increases the rate of median income growth over a full business cycle.
Moreover, the divergence between our pre-tax and post-tax series continues through the Creation Act of 2010. We will show that these tax policy interventions, together with increases in in-kind transfers-both of which are missed by conventional measures of pre-tax incomesubstantially cushioned the decline in resources actually available to the average American during the Great Recession and did so to a much greater extent than in previous recessions.
Hence these interventions and increases should be included in any income measure when attempting to show the role of government policy in mitigating income losses, or simply tracking the resources available to American households.
Median income trends during economic declines
Researchers commonly compare business cycle peaks to peaks or troughs to troughs, as we did above, to strip income trends of business-cycle variations. But it is also possible to focus on the relative severity of economic downturns across business cycles by examining similar periods in each business cycle. This can be done by comparing a fixed length of time after each peak year. Since two of the last four economic declines lasted just three years, we examine the recessions by comparing the first three years of economic decline following each business-cycle peak.
The first column of Table 1 But as Column 2 shows this is no longer the case once we include taxes and in-kind transfers. While doing so adds to the measured drop in median income in the 1980s recession, it reduces the drop in income over all other recessions. As a result, while the drop in median posttax income during the Great Recession remains greater than in the previous two recessions, it is a less severe decline than that seen over the [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] recession.
This pattern is even starker when we focus on the change in the mean income of the bottom quintile of the distribution in columns 3 and 4. Using a traditional pre-tax measure of income, the drop in mean income for the bottom quintile is slightly greater over the [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] recession (-13.96 In what follows, we focus solely on post-tax income and more precisely measure what sources of income are accounting for changes in median post-tax income and changes in the mean income of the bottom and top quintiles of the post-tax income distribution.
Method of accounting for shifts in income distributions
To isolate the factors that account for these changes over the last four recessions, we use a shift-share analysis similar to Burtless (1999) , Iceland (2003) , Daly and Valetta (2006) , and Larrimore (forthcoming). Shift-share analysis does not demonstrate causality but it is a common method for accounting for changes in household income via changes in demographic and sourcelevel income. It does so by allowing the demographic composition (age, race and marital status) and the sources of income of our population to change, one factor at a time, thus separately accounting for changes in income and income inequality. To avoid double counting, we consider the impact of each factor conditional on previously considered factors. For example, we account for the importance of declining marriage rates on changes in income, conditional on the age and race of the individual.
Embedded within this approach are four distinct techniques for decomposing income distribution changes. The first considers changes in the fraction of the population in subpopulation groups, including demographic groups or employment statuses. The second considers changes to source-level income distributions within these subpopulation groups, but keeps the rank-correlation of income sources constant. The third considers changes in the correlation of income sources over time. The fourth and most important for this paper, for analyzing tax changes, separates the policy-neutral tax liability changes that occur as a result of changes to underlying taxable income in a progressive tax system from those that occur from new tax policies.
The first three of these decomposition techniques are employed in Larrimore (forthcoming) and Burkhauser and Larrimore (forthcoming). Larrimore (forthcoming) also provides a further discussion of the decomposition approach, including discussions of robustness to order of analysis and variants to the sharing unit definition.
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Changes in the prevalence of subpopulation. Our first decomposition technique is based on Atkinson (1998) and Burtless (1999) . It accounts for changes in the frequencies of categorical characteristics in the population-including demographic trends. For example, it considers how an increase in the share of Hispanics in the total population will change the overall income distribution, holding the income distribution of whites, blacks, and Hispanics unchanged.
This technique reweights observations from the base year, t, such that the weighted fraction of the population in each demographic group matches that in future years, t'. We increase the weight of individuals with characteristics (e.g. Hispanic) that are more prevalent in year t' than in year t. This allows us to estimate the impact of changing the prevalence of those in the total population with this characteristic without altering the underlying income distributions within each group. In all cases, the base year, t, is the starting year of the business cycle. The comparison year, t' , is the comparison year during the trough of the business cycle.
Changes in source-level income distributions within population groups. The second
decomposition technique is based on Burtless (1999) and Daly and Valetta (2006) . It incorporates the fact that the income distribution within each subpopulation group is changing as well. These changes can result from any income source.
In doing so, note that each individual's income, can be represented as the sum of their incomes from each income source, through :
(1)
We assign individuals a percentile rank, , for each income source based on the rank of their source-level income within their subpopulation group k. For now, the correlations of individuals'
positions in the distribution of source-level incomes (rank-correlations) within each subpopulation group are assumed to be constant. This allows us to separate the importance of changes to income from a given income source from the change in the relationship between separate income sources.
To estimate the impact that changes to the distribution of source f 1 have on income inequality, each individual's income from the source f 1 in year t is replaced with the income of the individual at the same percentile rank of the source f 1 income distribution in year t':
This preserves the conditional earnings rank of each individual from source f 1 and the rankcorrelation of earnings from source f 1 with other income sources, while capturing changes in the source-level income distribution of source f 1 within each population group. Since this procedure combines income across years, prior to the analysis all income is adjusted for inflation using the CPI-U-RS. 
Changes in income-
To update the correlation between sources f 1 and f 2 , rather than dividing income into N separate sources, we divide income into (N-1) sources such that g 1 = f 1 + f 2 while f 3 through f N are unchanged. We capture the rank-correlation change of sources f 1 and f 2 by combining these sources before the rank-preserving income exchange rather than after. Thus, calling each individual's percentile-rank in the g 1 distribution , we calculate estimated incomes as: Changes in tax policies. Even in the absence of new tax policies, individuals' tax liabilities will change over time in response to income changes. If taxable income increases, then tax liabilities should as well, partially offsetting the increase in resources from those pre-tax income gains. Conversely, if taxable income declines then the reduction in tax liabilities partially offsets the fall in pre-tax income. However, tax liability changes may also result from new tax policies. Since this distinction is important for interpreting the relationship between taxes and income trends, we separate these two effects.
We first consider the policy-neutral tax change. In the sequential analysis, changes to tax liabilities are recomputed separately from changes to the underlying incomes that feed into tax computations. The policy-neutral tax change uses the NBER TaxSim program with the tax laws from year t but the incomes from year t' to observe how much tax liabilities would have increased or fallen if tax policies were left unchanged over the period of analysis, given the income changes previously observed in the analysis. This method for isolating policy-neutral tax changes is similar to those previously employed in the U.K. by Clark and Leicester (2004) , in
European countries by Bargain and Callan (2010) , and in the U.S. by Kasten, Sammartino, and Toder (1994) and Bargain et al. (2011) . 6 In all cases, constant policy taxes are based on inflationadjusted tax brackets, where the brackets from year t are adjusted using the CPI-U-RS up to price levels from year t' (see Kasten, Sammartino, and Toder, 1994 , for an illustration of how failing to do so dramatically increases policy-neutral tax liabilities due to inflation pushing individuals with unchanged real incomes into brackets with higher marginal tax rates).
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We then rerun the NBER TaxSim program using the actual tax laws in effect in year t' to determine the portion of tax changes attributed to new tax policies. The increase or decline in tax liabilities from this second NBER TaxSim analysis relative to that observed in the policy-neutral analysis is the change attributed to the new policies.
Accounting for shifts in median income during economic declines
The values in Row 1 of Table 2 repeat values first reported in the second column of Table   1 -the decline in median post-tax income during the first three years of each economic downturn since 1979. The rest of the rows in Table 2 show how much each factor accounts for these trends using the shift-share method described above.
This analysis starts with three major demographic trends: an aging population, a more racially and ethnically diverse population, and the decline in the rate of marriage in the population. 8 Rows 2 through 4 of Table 2 illustrate the change in median income accounted for by changes in the demographic makeup of the country. These estimated effects focus exclusively on changes in the number of people in the demographic groups and not on changes in the income gaps between these groups over the various recession years. We will capture this latter change in the decomposition of changing source-level income distributions below.
Given that demographic factors generally do not change substantially over the 2-to 4-year period of a recession, we include these factors largely as controls for demographic patterns which can influence long-term income distribution trends. These demographic trends, especially with respect to the growing Hispanic population who typically have lower mean incomes, provide a baseline level of median income decline in all recessions. Furthermore, this baseline median income decline is greater in the last two recessions than in the first two. However, with the exception of the early 2000s recession these factors account for less than 16 percent of median income declines in each recession and generally cannot explain differences in the severity of income declines across the recessions. The differences between the Great Recession and previous recessions become apparent when considering the changes in specific income sources. In doing so, we first focus on the primary members of a household. We separate them into male household heads or the spouses of household heads, which for short we call "primary males," and female household heads or the spouses of household heads, which for short we call "primary females." (In the CPS data, individuals are defined as household heads if they are the primary owners or primary renters of the dwelling.) This separates the impact of working children and other secondary earners from that of primary males and primary females in our analysis. In rows 5 and 6 of Table 2 we focus on the employment and earnings of primary males. In rows 7 and 8 we focus on the employment and earnings of primary females. Together, we observe that the labor earnings of these primary members of households represented 86 percent of all labor earnings in the United States in 2010.
During each recession since 1979, the employment rate of primary males declined, which accounts for a portion of the reduction in median household income (Row 5 of Table 2 ).
However, the decline in median income that their declining employment accounts for was greater during the 2007-2010 recession (2.32 percentage points) than any of the previous three recessions and over one-third of a percentage point greater than during the first three years (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) of the 1980s recession.
In contrast, as can be seen in Row 6 of Table 2 , the decline in median income accounted for by changes in the earnings distribution of primary males who were still employed during the 2007-2010 recession (1.98 percentage points) was substantially smaller than the 4.01 percentage point decline during 1979-1982. Thus, declining male employment rates-not declining male wage earnings-was the most important factor accounting for the severity of the first three years of the Great Recession: a dramatic difference from the first three years (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) of the last great recession.
The first four columns of Table 3 This is less than any of the previous recessions. However, this may actually reflect the severity of the recession if households combine to weather the economic storm, thereby increasing the number of employed adults in a household. 11 Nevertheless, there is much less variation in its importance in accounting for changes over the four recessions and these secondary labor earnings declines reduce household income in all periods.
Row 11 of Table 2 looks at private non-labor income. It declines in all recession periods except the recession of 1979-1982 where an increase in this income source offsets the decline in other sources of private market income. Part of the explanation for this increase may be the high real rate of return on bonds over this period due to inflation expectations. In contrast, the average rate of return on bonds during the Great Recession was much lower.
As we alluded to earlier, market income is only part of the story when considering income trends during recessions. Tax policies along with public in-cash (e.g. Unemployment
Insurance, etc.) and in-kind (e.g. SNAP, etc.) transfers are important components of many households' incomes-especially among those who experience earnings declines or job losses during the economic downturn. Burtless (2010) observed that the stimulus spending in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act represented about 2.5 percent of the national economy in 2010, so one may expect tax and transfer policies to have played a particularly large role during the Great Recession. This was the case.
The first 5 columns of This reflects the well-documented extension of Unemployment Insurance benefits to 99 weeks as well as a loosening in eligibility criteria, which greatly increased the availability of benefits to unemployed individuals (Farber and Valletta, 2013) .
Column 6 of Table 4 also includes the value of in-kind transfers (SNAP or Food Stamps, housing subsidies and school lunches) that are not included in the Census Bureau's measure of pre-tax income discussed in Table 1 . SNAP eligibility requirements were relaxed as part of the percent during the Great Recession, compared to a slight fall in the early 1980s. While we are unable to separate the cause of transfer increases into that due to the economic downturn relative to policy changes, Ziliak (2013) estimates that approximately half of the increase in food stamp usage during the Great Recession is due to economic factors and about a third is due to food stamp policy changes.
As can be seen in Row 12 of Table 2 , even though these transfer programs were primarily targeted at low income groups, their increase during the Great Recession had a noticeable impact on median post-tax income trends. During the first three years of the Great Recession, increases in transfers offset private sector income declines to a much greater extent than that seen in earlier recessions. While public transfer growth during recession years 1979-1982 only offset declines in median income by 0.34 percentage points, or 5 percent of the total change, public transfers mitigated median income declines by 1.70 percentage points, or 42 percent of the total change, in the 2007-2010 period. They were the single most important factor offsetting the decline in income over this period. This is consistent with Ziliak's (2013) observation that the SNAP program is successfully operating as an automatic stabilizer during the Great Recession.
Note however that there may be secondary effects of these programs which partially counteract the increased incomes from the direct effects observed here. 12 However, at least in the short-run, it appears that the direct effects of increases in public transfers-especially the growth and extension of in-cash unemployment benefits beyond that seen in previous recessions and the increased eligibility for means-tested in-kind transfer benefits like SNAP-mitigated a substantial fraction of the decline in market income during the recession on median post-tax income.
In addition to transfers, tax reductions and increases in tax credits are a tool increasingly used by policymakers as a countercyclical tool to offset market income declines. As can be seen in Column 7 of Table 4 , despite the substantial decline in market income during the [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] recession, this did not occur. Mean taxes paid by households increased slightly despite the recession. In contrast, during the Great Recession, income declines reducing tax liabilities as well as changes in tax policies designed to reduce tax burdens resulted in a decline of 12.61 percent in mean tax liabilities paid by households.
Changes in tax liabilities during a recession come from two distinct sources. The first occurs in a policy-neutral environment. To the degree that a recession lowers personal income, tax liabilities also fall. The second occurs through legislated tax policy changes that increase or reduce tax liabilities for individuals.
During the early 1980s recession, real market income fell and as a result, real tax liabilities fell when considered in a "policy-constant" setting. We account for this policyconstant component of tax liability in Row 13 of Table 2 . In 1979-1982 falling real incomes would have reduced the decline in post-tax median income by 6.61 percent with no change to tax laws.
But this was a period of substantial inflation and Congress opted not to adjust tax brackets for inflation (See Appendix Table 1 When we combine these median income increases from tax changes with those from public transfers, we estimate that government taxes and transfer policies accounted for a 3.69 percent increase in median post-tax income compared to the 0.06 offset during the [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] recession. This helps explain the surprising finding in Table 1 that when government taxes and in-kind transfers are added to pre-tax income, the decline in median post-tax income was smaller during the Great Recession than during the recession of 1979-1982.
Accounting for shifts at the bottom and top of the distribution
We use this same shift-share procedure to consider the factors accounting for trends in the mean income of the bottom and the top of the post-tax income distribution. Table 5 provides   such information for the bottom quintile while Table 6 does so for the top quintile.
Many of the same patterns emerge when accounting for income trends at the top or bottom of the distribution as were seen in the middle-although the magnitudes differ. At both the top and bottom of the distribution, decreases in primary male earnings account for the largest part of mean post-tax income declines in the early 1980s recession. In the Great Recession however, the decline in primary male earnings is less important than the decline in their employment. In the bottom quintile, the drop in primary male employment accounts for the largest part of the decline in mean post-tax income. But in the top quintile, reflecting the importance of investment income, the fall in non-labor income accounts for the largest part of the fall in mean income.
There are also dramatic differences in the importance of tax and transfer income on mean income of the bottom and top of the distribution. In the bottom quintile of the distribution, increases in public transfers are the single most important factor for mitigating income declines.
During the Great Recession, increases in transfer income offset almost 6 percentage points of the fall in income. This is over 3 times the increase in bottom quintile income accounted for by increased transfers in any of the previous recessions. Since very little transfer income goes to households in the top quintile of the distribution, it accounts for only a 0.34 percentage point increase in the mean income of these households.
Similarly, while tax legislation enacted during the Great Recession was more broad based, it still was targeted more towards low income households. For example, the $800 refundable Making Work Pay tax credit represents 6.2 percent of the income for tax units reporting income at or below $12,903 per year. But this credit is limited to $800 per tax unit.
Hence tax units making above $12,903 got no additional credits and the $800 credit is phased out at higher income levels. For couples, the credit was completely phased out at $150,000. So it is less important for higher income households. As a result, for the bottom quintile, reduced tax liabilities due to changes in tax policy accounted for more than a 3 percentage point increase in mean income. But for the top quintile, tax policy changes only accounted for a 0.24 percent increase in their mean income. This is in marked contrast to the 2000-2003 recession, where tax cuts in EGTRRA and JGTRRA offered substantial tax reductions for individuals at the bottom, middle, and top of the distribution through reductions in marginal tax rates at every income level.
Thus, in the 2000-2003 recession tax policy changes accounted for a larger, 3.91 percent, increase in mean income for the top quintile of the distribution than the 2.28 percent increase it accounted for among the bottom quintile.
Median income over the course of the Great Recession and its Aftermath
In Table 2 we compared the 4.10 percentage point decline in median income over the first three years of the Great Recession and the sources that accounted for it with the first three years of earlier recessions. But, the declines in income across these Great Recession years were not uniform, nor were the sources of income that accounted for them. In Table 7 we repeat our analysis of the sources of income that accounted for median income declines over the Great Table 2 . The last two columns extend our analysis to 2010-2011, the fourth consecutive year of median income decline (1.80 percent) and 2011-2012, the first year since the beginning of the Great Recession during which our median post-tax income measure increased (0.54 percent).
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The rest of the rows in Table 7 show how much each of our demographic and economic variables account for these annual declines in median income and provide some insight for the continuing decline in median income we observe past the official NBER end of the Great Recession.
As discussed in Table 2 , declines in primary male employment accounted for the largest single source of median income decline in the Great Recession. As can be seen in Table 7 and earnings factors in Table 7 accounted for an increase in median income.
The annual decomposition in Table 7 
Conclusions
Using a shift-share analysis to compare the factors underlying income trends in each of the past four recessions, we show that the falling real earnings of those who remained employed played a relatively minor role in median post-tax household income declines during the Great Recession. Instead, employment declines primarily drove these income declines, which would have been much greater, except for the unprecedented role of public tax and both in-cash and in-kind transfer policies. Because previous decomposition studies have not included the role of either tax policies or in-kind transfers, they will greatly understate the increasing role that government policies have played in mitigating median post-tax household income declines and understate the resources that were available to the bottom half of the distribution of Americans over the Great Recession.
However something that cannot be drawn from our analysis is whether this unprecedented use of tax and in-cash and in-kind benefits indirectly discouraged work over the period. We cannot rule out the possibility that these policies lengthened unemployment spells and thus degraded labor-market skills, so that these short-term increases in benefits during the first three years of the Great Recession made a return to work and wage earnings less likely.
Furthermore, both tax reductions and increased transfers come at the cost of increased public debt, which is not included in our analysis since it does not impact short-term economic resources.
What can be concluded is that the unprecedented importance of the direct effects of temporary tax and transfer policies for supporting median and bottom-quintile income during the recession means that their withdrawal-as policymakers shift their focus to deficit reduction and the scaling down of stimulus measures-is likely to result in short-term headwinds toward achieving growth in post-tax median income. Hence growth in post-tax median income over the remainder of the current business cycle will depend on the ability of currently under-or nonemployed individuals to find full-time jobs in a growing economy as we scale back these temporary public-transfer programs which limited median income declines over the Great Recession. Due to a change in CPS survey collection methods, income trends are not directly comparable between 1992 and 1993 (Ryscavage 1995 and Weinberg 2006 discuss this issue further). Because we assume that the change in the income series in this year is due solely to collection method differences, in Figure 1 , we assume there is no change in the income series in this year. This assumption matches that described in Larrimore (forthcoming), which is similar to that used by Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez (2011) and Burkhauser et al. (2012) .
Source: Authors' calculations using Public-Use March CPS data Table 5 : Factors accounting for changes in the mean income of the bottom quintile of the sizeadjusted post-tax household income distribution over the course of the past four recessions 1979-1982 1989-1992 2000-2003 2007-2010 (1) 1979-1982 1989-1992 2000-2003 2007-2010 ( 
